Definition of bashar al-assad in the makingoz.com dictionary. Meaning of bashar al-assad. What does bashar al-assad mean? Information and translations of bashar al-assad in the most comprehensive dictionary definitions resource on the web. May 31, · The Son of Perdition (Antichrist) Revealed: Bashar Assad, President of Syria 51 Main Points of Proof that Bashar Assad is The Man of Sin, Man of Lawlessness, Son of Perdition (the one people call the end time Anti-Christ/Antichrist) Click to listen to this article. (2 hours).
His father, Hafez al-Assad, was President of How to identify chemically ripened mangoes from to Born and raised in Damascus, Assad graduated from the medical school of Damascus University in bxshar began to work as a doctor in the Syrian Army. Four years later, he attended postgraduate studies at the Western Eye Hospital in London, specialising in ophthalmology. Inafter his elder brother Bassel died in a car crash, Bashar was recalled to Syria to take over Bassel's role as heir apparent.
He entered the military academy, taking charge of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon in On 10 JulyAssad was elected deos President, succeeding his father, who died in office a month prior. In the and ak election, he received On 16 JulyAssad was sworn in for another seven-year term after receiving The election was held only in areas controlled by the Syrian government during the country's ongoing civil war and was dismissed as a "sham" by the Syrian opposition and its Western allies, while an international delegation of observers from more than 30 countries led by Syria's allies stated that the election was "free and fair".
The Assad government describes itself as secular, while some political scientists have claimed that the government exploits sectarian tensions in the country and relies upon the Alawite asssad to remain in power. Previously seen by many states as a potential reformer, the United States, the European Union and the majority of xssad Arab League called for Assad's resignation from the presidency after he ordered crackdowns and military sieges ap Arab Spring protesters, which led to the Syrian Civil War.
During the Syrian Civil War, an inquiry by the United Nations reported finding evidence which implicated Assad in war crimes. In JuneAssad was included in a list of war crimes indictments of government officials and rebels handed to the International Criminal Court.
Assad has rejected allegations of war crimes and criticised the American-led intervention in Syria for attempting regime change.
The numerical value gta san andreas how to fly bashar al-assad in Chaldean Numerology is: 3.
The numerical value of bashar al-assad in What does bashar al assad mean Numerology is: 7. The tolerance of the United States and Israel with the crimes committed by Bashar al-Assad will not contribute to stability in the region.
The revolution of the Syrian people aims to end oppression and gain freedom, what is happening in Syria assd a violation of the values of freedom and human rights that America preaches around the world. The American administration should not remain silent in the face of the crimes committed by the regime. It looks like Russia may table new peace proposals for Syria, but the chances of a breakthrough are whaat, putin will use his first visit to the U.
We have proof that last week Bashr Arabia foreign minister :. Who is mad enough to believe that under these circumstances in Syria, anybody can hold elections?
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Wnat » Definition. Word in Definition. Wikipedia 0. How to pronounce bashar al-assad? Alex US English. Daniel British. Karen Australian. Veena Indian. How to say bashar al-assad in sign language? Numerology Chaldean Numerology The numerical value of bashar al-assad in Chaldean Numerology is: 3 Pythagorean Numerology The numerical value of bashar al-assad in Pythagorean Numerology is: 7.
Examples of bashar al-assad in a Sentence Omar Mushaweh : The tolerance of the United States and Israel with the crimes committed by Bashar al-Assad will not contribute to stability bbashar the region. Richard Gowan : It looks like Russia may table new peace proposals for Syria, but the chances of a breakthrough are low, putin will use his first visit to the U. Emmanuel Meab : We have proof that last week Saudi Arabia foreign minister : There will be no Bashar al-Assad in the future.
George Sabra : Who is mad enough to believe that under these circumstances msan Syria, anybody can hold elections? Select another language:. Please enter your email address: Subscribe.
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Dec 15, · In addition, the National Defence Forces (NDF) had their origins in the many localized militias but have since been bound more tightly to the official Syrian state apparatus. This article aims to analyse how this fragmentation impacts Bashar al-Assad’s role as the leader of Syria. Jun 10, · In the eyes of many Syrians, Bashar became president by default, given the absence of any alternative. This situation had been created by Hafiz al-Assad himself, who had devoted the final years of his rule to ensuring the succession of Bashar and the removal from play of Cited by: Jun 02, · Now, the survival of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime ironically rests on the outcome of the U.S. presidential election this November and what it will mean for U.S.-Iranian relations. The.
Bashar al-Assad's ascent to power following the death of his father, Hafiz al-Assad, on June 10, , surprised no one. It had been an open secret in Syria for some years that this was Hafiz al-Assad's wish.
Not only does Bashar lack maturity, experience, and self-confidence, Syria-watchers generally agree that Bashar also lacks charisma and leadership qualities. As one noted expert on Syria put it, Bashar lacks the "killer instinct" vital to anyone who would rule the country. Lubrani was quoted as saying:. Bashar has no chance at all of long-term survival in power because the generals in the Syrian army will never come to terms with this "kid" ruling over them.
In the Arab world, Bashar's rise to power was received with undisguised derision—toward the man himself as well as the Syrian "Socialist Democratic Popular Republic," which Hafiz al-Assad and his son had turned into a monarchy, even a family fiefdom. The man in the street shrugged his shoulders in answer to the question, "Why Bashar?
This situation had been created by Hafiz al-Assad himself, who had devoted the final years of his rule to ensuring the succession of Bashar and the removal from play of any other potential candidate. The two and a half years that have passed since Bashar's rise to power in Syria have been relatively calm and stable. Nevertheless, the Syrians' attitude toward Bashar has not changed: ma fi ghayru. The reason: during these two years, Bashar has not persuaded the average Syrian that he is a worthy successor to his father.
And despite two years in power, Bashar has remained the same young, raw, inexperienced, and insecure ruler, who has yet to prove he is capable of leading the country. The fact that Bashar has not yet won the trust of his people, and that his ability to govern Syria is still questioned, does not mean that his rule is in immediate danger. But he does not sit easily upon his father's throne.
The selection of a young and inexperienced leader who lacks public trust may be inconsequential in a country that benefits from political stability and long-standing democratic traditions. But Syria is a country suffering from severe social and economic problems that require immediate and unequivocal solutions.
More important, Syria plays a crucial regional role and may even decide the fate of the region—for better or worse, for peace or war. The vacuum created at the top of the ruling pyramid in Damascus presents problems, not just for Syria but for the region as a whole.
Bashar was not his father's first choice. For years, Hafiz al-Assad had groomed his eldest son, Basil, for the succession.
But after Basil perished in an automobile accident in January , it became increasingly clear that the ailing father was determined to keep the succession in the family and to pass the scepter to Bashar. Yet during the six years that Bashar wore the informal mantle of "heir designate," he remained an enigma.
He gave the public no opportunity to assess his worldview, political preferences, or even his personal qualities. The low profile was a matter of policy. His father did not want to alarm Syria's senior military and political figures, some of who coveted the job for which he was being groomed. So Hafiz al-Assad refrained from declaring Bashar to be his chosen successor, and Bashar disappeared into the military.
Absent from the public eye, he remained an unknown quantity. Nevertheless, some impressions could be gleaned from the tidbits revealed by people who met him, as well as from newspaper interviews he so sparingly granted.
Bashar came across as an open-minded and intelligent young man with a modern Western outlook, who recognized the need for a real change in Syria. Optimistic observers cited with approval his stay in London, where he had been a resident in ophthalmology at a local hospital, as well as his deep familiarity with the Internet. This image of a reformer, of a man of the world familiar with Western ways and views, made it easier for many, inside and outside Syria, to accept Bashar as his father's heir.
Bashar continued to bask in optimistic Western expectations even after he took office. The smooth transition of power upon his father's death contributed to his aura. The only sour note was sounded by his uncle Rif'at, a self-styled potentate who described Bashar's rise to power as "a knife in the back of the Syrian nation.
Nevertheless, the smooth transition was something of a trompe l'oeil. It resulted from more than the absence of an alternative. In fact, it resulted from a deliberate decision by Syria's real powerbrokers to avoid a choice on the matter of succession.
They had decided to defer a decision to some point in the future and to make do with Bashar in the interim, initiating what they saw as a transitional period between the Assad dynasty and a different era. Bashar's success in smoothly ascending to power might best be explained as follows: Syria's senior leadership, aware of Hafiz al-Assad's impending demise, wished to deflect any possible threat, domestic or external, to the existence and stability of the regime.
Bashar remained the best possible option, especially since everyone else mentioned as a possible heir had been removed from the political scene by the late president in the years before his death. But above all, Bashar did not threaten anyone.
Lacking any power or status, he could not challenge the senior leadership and the powerful vested interests of the country. Nor did he profess any dangerous ideas. His worldview, to the extent he had one, lacked substance, or at least remained inchoate. Syrian defense minister Mustafa Talas, for years a close friend of Hafiz al-Assad, perfectly expressed the motive behind the decision of the powerbrokers to accept Bashar.
In an interview granted to the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram , Talas admitted that,. With Assad's death, we began to think that either I or Vice President 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam were worthy of filling the shoes of the dead president. However, in view of the fact that all of us were past seventy years of age, we were afraid of a situation in which every year we would have to change the country's leader, as had happened in the former Soviet Union. After all, we were among his close friends.
It perfectly suited this old guard that some sectors of the Syrian public—most notably, intellectuals and businessmen—saw Bashar as someone destined to change or even revolutionize Syrian life. The senior leadership duly noted Bashar's popularity and conveniently drew on the public favor that Bashar commanded. Two years later, there is no obvious threat to Bashar on the horizon. But holding on to power is also the sum of his achievement.
Syria under Bashar has been about preservation of the status quo at any price—a kind of immobility cherished by the powerbrokers. The plain fact is that Bashar has not initiated anything in the crucial areas of domestic policy, socioeconomic affairs, and foreign relations.
As a result, Syria's cart remains stuck precisely in that rut where Hafiz al-Assad left it. In the early months of Bashar's "rule," he took a few limited steps toward political and economic reforms. In a moment of enthusiasm, Syria-watchers dubbed this the "Damascus Spring. Bashar's ostensible support for these forums encouraged a round of petitions signed by prominent Syrian intellectuals. Some of them even established a "Committee for the Establishment of a Civil Society.
But this openness was very short-lived, and in mid Bashar led or more precisely was pushed into leading a counterattack against the supporters of the reforms.
Regime spokesmen, and even Bashar himself, labeled the reformists "agents of the West whose only aim is the undermining of Syrian domestic stability, in the service of the enemies of the state. Among them were members of the Syrian People's Assembly, Ma'mun al-Humsi and Riyyad as-Sayf, each of whom was sentenced to five years in prison for "countermanding the constitution and harming state security.
When Bashar recognized that he could go no further in allowing free political debate, he decided to invest his energy in the economy. He would lead a process of liberalization that would open the Syrian economy to the world economy—or so he thought. Initially, he tried to promote the opening of private banks in Syria, and in December , he even persuaded the Baath Party Regional Command to ratify a decision to this effect, culminating in April in new legislation.
Since then, not a single private bank has opened in Syria. On the contrary, in mid, Bashar himself was quoted as saying, "Private banks pose a threat to the national economy.
It should be stressed that Bashar himself initiated, or at least encouraged the reformist camp, both political and economic, during his own honeymoon.
The old guard forced him to reverse gears, as soon as they suspected that the appetites of the reformists knew no bounds. Bashar obliged. His capitulation demonstrated his lack of the political experience and power essential to making decisive moves inside Syria, especially when they involved confronting entrenched power centers.
Even more important, the end of the "Damascus Spring" demonstrated that Bashar had no clear vision of his own goals. His commitment to reform did not run deeper than a generalized belief in the need to improve government administration. Bashar's inability to lead also marked Syrian foreign policy.
In his first two years, Bashar presided over the weakening of Syria's position in Lebanon, and a deterioration of the balance with Israel in Lebanon that almost led to a military confrontation. Relations between Damascus and Washington reached a nadir, and tensions increased in Syria's relations with its Arab allies, above all Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and even Jordan.
Bashar and the Intifada. With the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada in October , Bashar thought to exploit it to promote his personal standing as well as Syria's regional status. Bashar thought the uprising presented him with a golden opportunity to establish himself as the head of the radical Arab camp, or at least as the head of a state that had adopted an uncompromising stand toward Israel.
But in his effort to ride the intifada to influence in the Arab world, Bashar came off as an impulsive and frivolous wannabe. His immaturity led him to make rash statements, including strongly worded expressions of support for terrorist attacks against Israel and gratuitously anti-Semitic remarks. In March , Bashar stated in a speech to an Arab summit conference in Beirut that any Israeli, wherever he may be, is a legitimate target for a terrorist attack. Some of Bashar's utterances were reminiscent of his father's statements in the early years of his rule, when Hafiz al-Assad was mired in a deep conflict with Israel.
But Hafiz al-Assad had matured over the years and learned to differentiate between his vision, which absolutely negated the existence of Israel, and the constraints of reality, which required that he adopt a balanced tone and a pragmatic policy. The father knew how to dance the dance, right up to the brink of a peace agreement with Israel.
Bashar did not have the savvy to follow this act. Rather than pick up where his father left off, he started all over again, at the very same rhetorical point where his father began back in November , when he first seized power. Syria in Lebanon. The weakening of Syria's position in Lebanon began after the Israeli army withdrew from southern Lebanon in May but gained momentum under Bashar. Shortly after he took office, voices began to be heard from Lebanon, mainly but not exclusively from the Christian-Maronite camp, calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country.
Bashar naively hoped that if he decreased the daily friction between Syrian troops and the Lebanese population, it would diminish criticism of Syria. Bashar's weakened position in the Lebanese arena was most evident in his relationship with the leader of Hizbullah, Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah.
Nasrallah himself admitted at one time that he had never had a personal, face-to-face meeting with Hafiz al-Assad. Assad senior probably saw no reason for such a meeting; he would have regarded Nasrallah as one more pawn. Bashar, on the other hand, met with Nasrallah frequently, as if to bask in Nasrallah's victorious glow.
Nasrallah was quick to cast his cloak of patronage over the young leader in Damascus: he would show the new boy the ropes. Nasrallah said on more than one occasion that Hizbullah would support Bashar in securing his standing at home and protecting Syrian interests abroad—as though Bashar were incapable of doing so himself.